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 These are appeals heard under the formal procedure pursuant 
to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, from the 
refusal of the Board of Assessors of the Town of Lancaster 
(“appellee” or “assessors”) to abate taxes on certain parcels of 
real estate located in Lancaster owned by and assessed to 
Atlantic Union College (“appellant”), under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 
and 38, for fiscal years 2014, 2015, and 2016 (“fiscal years at 
issue”). 
 Commissioner Rose heard these appeals.  Chairman Hammond 
and Commissioners Scharaffa and Good joined him in the decisions 
for the appellant.  Commissioner Chmielinski dissented.   
These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a 
request by the appellant under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 
1.32. 
 
 David G. Saliba, Esq. for the appellant. 
 
 Ellen M. Hutchinson, Esq. for the appellee.   
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT 
On the basis of testimony and exhibits offered into 
evidence at the hearing of these appeals, the Appellate Tax 
Board (“Board”) made the following findings of fact. 
On January 1, 2013, January 1, 2014, and January 1, 2015, 
the relevant valuation and assessment dates for the fiscal years 
at issue, the appellant was the assessed owner of the 12 parcels 
of real estate at issue in these appeals (collectively “subject 
property”).    
For each of the fiscal years at issue, the appellant timely 
filed Forms 3 ABC and abatement applications for the subject 
property, which the assessors denied or deemed denied.  The 
appellant seasonably filed Petitions Under Formal Procedure with 
the Board for the subject property for each of the fiscal years 
at issue.  On the basis of its findings, the Board found and 
ruled that it had jurisdiction over the appeals for the fiscal 
years at issue.  
The appellant presented its case through the testimony of 
the following witnesses:  Dr. Carlyle Simmons, Trustee of the 
appellant; Dr. Avis Hendrickson, President of the appellant; 
Milton Montague, Security Director of the appellant; Leslie Aho, 
Physical Plant Manager of the appellant; and Silas McKinney, 
Chief Financial Officer and Vice President of Finance of the 
appellant.    
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At all times relevant to this appeal, the appellant was a 
private liberal arts college affiliated with the Seventh-day 
Adventist Church.  The appellant’s entire campus consisted of 
about 30 parcels, including the subject property.  The subject 
property was used as follows: 2 parcels were parking lot or 
storage areas; 1 parcel was a combination of classrooms, a 
cafeteria, and residences; and the remaining 9 parcels were 
student and faculty housing.  The appellant was incorporated in 
1883 and has had a lengthy history of exemption from taxation 
pursuant to G.L. c. 59, § 5, Clause Third (“Clause Third”).  In 
May of 2011, the appellant suspended its bachelor of arts degree 
program at the subject property after losing its accreditation 
because of financial hardship.  The appellee began to tax the 
subject property in fiscal year 2013.  Other parcels within the 
Atlantic Union College campus remain exempt. 
Dr. Simmons testified that the appellant never lost its 
charter during the relevant time periods, and that college 
administration and facilities departments worked towards 
regaining accreditation during the suspension period between May 
of 2011 and August of 2015, when the appellant resumed its 
degree program at the subject property.  Dr. Simmons testified 
that, after the suspension, he and the other members of the 
Board of Trustees immediately began communicating with the 
Massachusetts Department of Education (“MDOE”) and the New 
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England Association of Schools and Colleges (“NEASC”) to discern 
the specific steps required for the college to regain 
accreditation.  He further testified that the appellant, in 
fact, hired a consultant to assist in the process of regaining 
accreditation.  According to Dr. Simmons, the appellant 
“maintained constant administrative structure for the 
institution” through monthly administrative meetings with the 
subject property’s caretakers, the financial director of the 
college, and the officers of the appellant’s employees’ union.  
The Board of Trustees also continued to meet quarterly, and 
Dr. Simmons testified that at those meetings, the officers 
discussed the financial state of the appellant, the maintenance 
and security measures in place to ensure the subject property’s 
upkeep, “and of course . . . efforts to regain our 
accreditation.”   
Furthermore, Dr. Simmons testified, the appellant continued 
to provide certain programs at the subject property during its 
loss of accreditation period.  First, the Thayer Performing Arts 
Center (“TPAC”) continued to accept students into its music and 
performing arts programs under the auspices of the college.  The 
Northeast Evangelism Training School (“NETS”), a certificate 
program designed to teach students the techniques and strategies 
of conducting Bible studies, evangelism, and healthy-living 
education, which began operating at the subject property in 
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2013, also continued to operate during the relevant time 
periods.  The Adult Education Program also continued operating 
during this time.  Finally, the Teach Out Program, which began 
shortly after accreditation ceased at the college, enabled 
nursing students who were in the process of completing their 
degrees to continue their studies at neighboring Wachusett 
Community College while some of them continued to live at the 
subject property.  The appellant also provided some professors 
and others who were employed by the appellant, as well as some 
students engaged in the Teach Out Program, with continued living 
quarters at the subject property during the relevant time 
periods. 
Moreover, Dr. Simmons and Dr. Hendrickson both testified 
that the appellant’s academic office was in continual operation 
to assist current students by providing housing, distributing 
transcripts, and providing other business functions.  The 
appellant also continued to maintain the entire campus by paying 
all taxes, utilities, and insurance fees, and providing 
landscaping, maintenance, and repairs to the subject property.  
Dr. Hendrickson testified that when she began her employment 
with the appellant, on January 1, 2015, that the subject 
property was being continuously occupied by the appellant, 
despite the suspension of granting degrees.  She further 
testified that the suspension of admitting new students was 
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temporary, and that the appellant never intended to cease its 
operations at the subject property during the relevant time 
periods.  The appellant began admitting new students again in 
August of 2015.  
  Mr. Montague, Security Director of the appellant, 
corroborated the testimony of Dr. Simmons and Dr. Hendrickson 
that the college continued to maintain the campus, and he 
further testified that the appellant continued to patrol and 
provide security to all major parts of the campus during the 
relevant time periods.  He also testified that employees of the 
appellant continued to live on campus during the relevant time 
periods, including the groundskeeper and the chief financial 
officer of the college, and that some students also continued to 
live on campus even during the suspension of degree-granting 
authority.  Even with respect to the parts of campus where 
students were not residing during the suspension, the college 
continued to secure the buildings and to provide heating and 
electrical service to the campus as well as landscaping and snow 
removal and tending to issues with the subject property as they 
occurred.  Mr. Aho, the Physical Plant Manager of the appellant, 
also corroborated the testimony regarding the upkeep and repairs 
made to the subject property at all relevant time periods, and 
he further testified to the proactive steps that he and the 
maintenance department took to respond to specific issues, 
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including suspected mold in the basement area of one of the 
buildings located on the subject property. Finally, 
Mr. McKinney, the Chief Financial Officer and Vice President of 
Finance of the appellant, also testified that the appellant 
continued to maintain and secure the subject property during the 
relevant time periods.    
The appellee presented as a witness Debra Sanders, the 
principal assessor for the appellee.  She testified to the 
rationale behind assessing the subject property, explaining that 
by the start of fiscal year 2013, the appellant still had not 
regained accreditation, and the board of assessors “wanting to 
be as fair as possible” reviewed the exemption as follows:  
So the board looked at it in two ways.  They looked at 
the educational buildings, and then they looked at the 
residential buildings.  They felt that the educational 
buildings should be exempt, but as far as the 
residential buildings, they felt that because there 
was no students in those buildings that they needed to 
be taxed. 
 
On the basis of the evidence of record, the Board found 
that the appellant continued to operate in furtherance of its 
charitable purpose during the relevant time periods, despite the 
suspension of its ability to confer academic degrees.  The TPAC, 
NETS, and Adult Education programs continued to operate on 
campus, as the appellant continued to provide housing to those 
students participating in the Teach Out Program in conjunction 
with neighboring Wachusett Community College.  Moreover, the 
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appellant’s academic offices remained open to assist students 
with finding housing and other academic support during the 
suspension period.  Furthermore, the appellant regarded its loss 
of accreditation as a temporary phase.  The appellant 
continually strove to reopen and took active steps towards that 
goal, including communications with MDOE and NEASC as well as 
monthly Board of Trustees meetings.  These active steps included 
maintenance of the subject property; during the relevant time, 
the appellant continued to maintain the subject property by 
providing repairs, security, and snow removal services, as well 
as housing to professors, employees, and students.  The Board 
found it illogical that the appellee concedes that the academic 
portions of the campus should continue to be exempt during the 
accreditation suspension and yet taxed the residential portions 
that were no less utilized or maintained during the relevant 
time periods. 
The Board found and ruled that the appellant’s occupancy of 
the subject property was in furtherance of its educational 
purpose, which is a traditionally charitable purpose.  
Therefore, the Board found and ruled that the subject property 
was entitled to exemption.   
Accordingly, the Board issued decisions abating the taxes 





Clause Third provides that real estate owned by a 
“charitable organization and occupied by it or its officers for 
the purposes for which it is organized” is exempt from taxation.  
Clause Third defines a charitable organization as “a literary, 
benevolent, charitable or scientific institution or temperance 
society incorporated in the commonwealth.”  “For purposes of the 
local property tax exemption, the term ‘charity’ includes more 
than almsgiving and assistance to the needy.”  New England Legal 
Found. v. Boston, 423 Mass. 602, 609 (1996).  “A charity, in the 
legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift to be applied 
consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an 
indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or 
hearts under the influence of education or religion, by 
relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by 
assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting 
or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise lessening 
the burdens of government.”  Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc. v. 
Assessors of Boston, 294 Mass. 248, 254-55 (1936) (quoting 
Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539, 556 (1867)).  
As observed by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court in New Habitat, Inc. v. Tax Collector of Cambridge, 
451 Mass. 729 (2008) provided “an interpretive lens through 
which we now view” charitable exemption cases.  Mary Ann Morse 
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Healthcare Corp. v. Assessors of Framingham, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 
701, 703 (2009).  As the Appeals Court explained,  
[t]he number of individuals receiving services, 
whether they are from diverse walks of life, the fees 
charged to those individuals, and the relationship 
between the service fees and the cost of those 
services to the provider - all these are factors that 
inform a decision under the community benefit test; 
where however an organization is found to be 
traditionally charitable in nature, these factors play 
“a less significant role in our determination of its 
charitable status” for purposes of property tax 
exemption.  
 
Id. at 704 (quoting New Habitat, 451 Mass. at 737). 
The Supreme Judicial Court has long recognized that 
“bringing [recipients’] minds or hearts under the influence of 
education” is a traditionally charitable purpose.  Boston 
Symphony Orchestra, 294 Mass. at 254-55; Assessors of Boston v. 
Garland Sch. of Home Making, 296 Mass. 378 (1937).  Therefore, 
because education is a traditionally charitable purpose, factors 
like fees and the number of people benefitted by the appellant’s 
programs are less important in determining the appellant’s 
charitable status.  See New Habitat, 451 Mass. at 736-37 
(finding an organization to be charitable where it had small 
number of beneficiaries but traditionally charitable purposes 
and methods) (citing Dover v. Dominican Fathers Province of St. 
Joseph, 334 Mass. 530, 539 (1956)).  Instead, a court should 
“consider whether the number of an organization’s beneficiaries 
helps to advance the organization’s charitable purpose.”  New 
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Habitat, 451 Mass. at 737 (citing New England Legal Found., 423 
Mass. at 612 (“at any given moment an organization may serve 
only a relatively small number of persons” but still be found to 
be charitable if operating according to its stated charitable 
purpose”)).  
In the instant appeal, the appellant had lost its 
accreditation prior to the start of the fiscal years at issue, 
and so the majority of its students had sought other academic 
opportunities.  However, the Board found credible the witnesses’ 
testimony regarding the appellant’s efforts to regain its 
accreditation, including meetings with the MDOE and NEASC as 
well as monthly Board of Trustees meetings.  The appellant never 
lost its charter during the relevant time periods, and it kept 
its academic offices open to continue to assist students during 
the suspension period.  Some employees and students of the 
appellant continued to reside in campus housing, the former 
continuing to maintain the subject property and the latter 
furthering their academic careers through initiatives like Teach 
Out with a neighboring college.  Moreover, the appellant 
continued to offer and teach students in its non-degree and 
certificate education programs, specifically TPAC, NETS, and the 
Adult Education Program.  The Board thus found and ruled that 
the subject property was still being operated as part of an 
educational institution, a traditionally charitable endeavor, 
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and that the subject property was being no less utilized and 
maintained than the other campus parcels, which the appellee 
concedes were exempt.  The fact that a small number of students 
were served during the suspension period is not of concern when 
the organization is traditionally charitable in nature.  See New 
Habitat, 451 Mass. at 737.   
When the property at issue involves a residential facility 
owned by a charitable organization, a determination must be made 
as to whether the property is occupied by the residents in their 
individual capacities or by the organization itself.  Mary Ann 
Morse Healthcare Corp., 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 704.  The Supreme 
Judicial Court has specifically found that the occupation of 
dormitories is not by the individual students but by the 
charitable organization.  “Dormitories, dining halls and boarding 
houses intended primarily for and actually devoted to the use and 
benefit of students attending incorporated institutions of 
learning are exempt from taxation.”  Springfield YMCA v. Assessors 
of Springfield, 284 Mass. 1, 6 (1933) (citing Phillips Academy 
v. Andover, 175 Mass. 118, 125 (1900)).  See also M.I.T. Student 
House, Inc. v. Assessors of Boston, 350 Mass. 539, 542 (1966) 
(finding that a “student house” that was occupied by needy 
students who paid a small rental fee to the taxpayer was like “a 
‘dormitory or boarding house’” and that the occupation of such is 
by the corporation itself and not the residents, “just as the 
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occupation of a college dormitory [] is that of the institution of 
learning”);  Franklin Square House v. Boston, 188 Mass. 409, 411 
(1905) (“The occupation of the property is that of the corporation 
itself, and not of those to whom it affords a home, just as the 
occupation of a college dormitory or refectory is that of the 
institution of learning rather than that of its students.”). 
So long as a property is occupied by the charitable 
organization for the purpose for which it was organized, the 
occupancy will satisfy Clause Third.  See Mary Ann Morse 
Healthcare Corp., 74 Mass. App. Ct. at 706 (ruling that the 
provision of housing to elderly residents was consistent with 
organization’s charitable purpose).  The Board found that the 
use of the subject property to house employees of the appellant 
who were continuing to maintain the subject property while the 
administration was working towards regaining accreditation, and 
by students who were continuing to pursue their academic degrees 
at another institution while their degrees from the appellant 
were on hold, was consistent with and in furtherance of the 
appellant’s charitable purposes.  The endeavors of the employees 
and the students contributed to the promotion of the academic 
program and therefore the charitable purpose of the appellant.  
See, e.g., The Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, Inc. 
v. Assessors of the Town of Williamstown, Mass. ATB Findings of 
Fact and Reports 2015-581, 591.   
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On the basis of its findings, the Board ruled that the 
appellant continued to operate the subject property in 
furtherance of its charitable purpose of education.  Therefore, 
the Board found that the subject property satisfied Clause Third 
during the relevant time periods.   
Accordingly, the Board issued decisions for the appellant 
in these appeals. 
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